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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 950035-CA 
v. : 
LOUIS M. CLARK : Category No. 2 
De f endant-Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the imposition of consecutive 
sentences following convictions for two counts of falsely signing 
a financial transaction card sales slip, second degree felonies, 
in violat ion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1991), in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is defendant's appeal barred following this Court's 
dismissal of defendant's previous appeal of the same issue raised 
in the present appeal? This issue concerns the scope of this 
Court's discretionary appellate power, consideration of which 
does not involve a standard of review. 
2. Should this Court consider the merits of defendant's 
claim when defendant has failed (1) to address an independent 
ground upon which the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
correct sentence, (2) to object in the trial court, and (3) to 
properly reference the record and the decision purportedly 
appealed from? "As a general rule, a timely and specific 
objection must be made in order to preserve an issue for appeal. 
Absent a timely objection, [an appellate court] will review an 
alleged error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it 
constitutes "plain error." State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-
21 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). An appellate court will 
decline to review the merits of a claim that has not been 
adequately briefed under rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing 
defendant to consecutive sentences? "A sentence will not be 
overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or 
imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." 
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution - Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
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Utah Code Ann. (1995) 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences -
Limitations. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has 
been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall 
run concurrently unless the court states in the 
sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal 
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of 
the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(7) A statement of the case. The 
statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review shall follow. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a 
statement that no addendum is necessary under 
this paragraph. . . . The addendum shall 
contain a copy of: 
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(C) those parts of the record on 
appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the 
challenged instructions, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the 
transcript of the court's oral decision, or 
the contract or document subject to 
construction. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Louis M. Clark, was charged by information with 
three counts of falsely signing a financial transaction card 
sales slip, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1991) (R. 8-10). At the preliminary 
hearing count I was dismissed on the State's motion (R. 4). 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted on both remaining 
counts (R. 108-09). After trial, but before the trial court 
sentenced defendant, defendant appealed his conviction (R. 118). 
This Court dismissed that appeal for defendant's failure to file 
a docketing statement (R. 123). 
Following sentencing, defendant was ordered to serve 
consecutive terms of from one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 127-28).* Defendant filed a new appeal (Case No. 
930278-CA) (R. 131) , challenging the sentences on the ground that 
the trial court had allegedly demanded his cooperation at 
sentencing by requesting he give information that would reveal 
additional criminal activities, in violation of his right to 
1
 The sentences which defendant challenges on appeal were 
also to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed in a prior 
conviction of falsely signing a financial card sales slip, i.e., 
case no. 921901310, tried in Third District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Judge Timothy Hanson, presiding (R. 127-28, 
374-75). 
4 
silence under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
or risk harsher punishment (see Docketing Statement, p. 2, and 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Affirmance in 
Case No- 930278-CA, pp. 1-2, attached as Addendum A and B, 
respectively). Defendant's appeal was dismissed for failure to 
file a brief (R. 421). 
Six months later, defendant moved the trial court to correct 
his sentences on the same grounds urged in his current appeal, 
case no. 950035 (R. 428-42) . The trial court denied the motion 
(R. 451-55), and it is from that ruling that defendant 
purportedly appeals (R. 456). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of falsely signing a 
financial transaction card sales slip (R. 127-28) through a 
scheme involving the complicity of others in which credit cards 
were intercepted between banks in the eastern United States and 
Texas to be sold on the street (R. 388) . Specifically, defendant 
was found guilty of the charged offenses by entering two Salt 
Lake City banks, presenting stolen credit cards and falsified 
driver's licences and signing two transaction card sales slips to 
receive cash advancements in an amount totalling twenty-five 
hundred dollars (PSR#2, p. 1-2). 
2
 A more detailed statement of the facts relating to the 
substantive offense is not pertinent to the disposition of the 
issue raised on appeal, and accordingly, they are omitted. 
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At the first of three sentencing hearings the trial court 
indicated that it had the presentence report in Judge Hanson's 
case and a brief update (R. 374).3 Defendant argued for 
leniency in sentencing, stating that he had been erroneously 
associated with the "Nigerian Mafia,ff4 and thereby unduly 
sentenced to a harsh term by Judge Hanson (R. 375-78, 380-81). In 
response, the prosecutor pointed out: that defendant had given 
the Adult Probation and Parole investigator the names of people, 
neither of whom provided any useful information about defendant 
(PSR#1, p. 7); that defendant acted evasively in explaining to 
the investigator what happened in the offense; that because 
information could not be obtained from defendant there was no way 
to truly determine the existence of any prior criminal record; 
and that defendant continued to act evasively by refusing to 
provide any statement or background information that would assist 
AP&P in determining an appropriate sentence (R. 379-80). 
The trial court expressed its frustration, stating that 
3
 The presentence report in both the case tried before 
Judge Hanson and this case are cited as "PSR#1" and "PSR#2,I! 
respectively. Defendant's culpable conduct in the case tried 
before Judge Hanson was substantially similar to his conduct in 
this case. In that case defendant presented a stolen credit card 
under the name Manuel Ramos with a false Virginia driver's 
license under the same name to a teller of a First Security Bank 
for a cash advance of thirty-five hundred dollars (PSR#1, p. 1-
2) . 
4
 The record in this case contains an article and a report 
describing the "Nigerian Mafia,lf a group allegedly organizing 
credit card fraud in the United States (R. 12-13, 15-22). The 
presentence report in Judge Hanson's case makes several 
references to law enforcement's belief that defendant was 
affiliated with this group (PSR#1, p. 3). 
6 
without any indication in the presentence report about the facts 
surrounding this and other similar incidents, and the complexity 
of these well thought-out credit card manipulations, it did not 
know how to proceed (R. 385-86) . The court further noted that if 
defendant refused to disclose how the crime was committed, 
whether by himself or with conspirators, defendant would pay a 
heavy penalty (R. 386-87, 391-92). The trial court found that 
the presentence reports lacked adequate explanations of how the 
offense occurred, and that under the circumstances it was 
defendant's duty to contact AP&P if he wanted to make further 
disclosure at this point in the proceedings; otherwise, defendant 
risked greater punishment (R. 388-90). The court also stated 
that defendant had nothing to lose by giving his relative's 
names; even if they did not want to get involved, they should 
speak to his good character (R. 393). On defendant's 
representation that AP&P had made only an initial contact with 
him, and in order to allow defendant the opportunity of making 
further disclosure, the hearing was continued to February 22, 
1993 (R. 391). 
At the February 22 hearing, defendant informed the court 
that AP&P had not contacted him (R. 395). The trial court 
reiterated its sentencing concerns, and directed defendant to 
speak with a detective, which would demonstrate his 
cooperativeness in solving other crimes and demonstrate that 
defendant did not have a attitude problem (evidenced by his 
refusal to divulge any information to AP&P) which required 
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adjustment through more severe sentencing (R. 397-98). The trial 
court did indicate at this point that it was not so concerned 
with the deficiencies in the presentence report (R. 3 98). It 
also indicated that if defendant cooperated, it would consider 
concurrent sentences, but if he did not, then it would be 
inclined to impose sentences consecutively (R. 399). At this 
point defendant had not argued that his refusal to provide AP&P 
with basic information about himself and the details of the 
offense was based on a privilege against self-incrimination, and 
the trial court's inclination to impose consecutive sentences was 
based on defendant's refusal. The hearing was again continued in 
order to give defendant an opportunity to cooperate (R. 399). 
On March 22, 1993, defendant informed the trial court that 
he had not met with law enforcement to disclose other crimes in 
which he might have been involved and the identity of co-
conspirators (R. 4 02-03). He asserted that in the face of 
potential federal prosecution on twenty other similar incidences 
he had the right to refuse interviews with law enforcement under 
the Fifth Amendment and the state constitution (R. 4 02-05) . 
Therefore, he argued, it was improper for the trial court to 
impose three consecutive sentences if he did not cooperate (R. 
406-410). 
The trial court stated that it did not intend defendant to 
relinquish his right to remain silent and would not expect 
defendant to incriminate himself absent a grant of immunity from 
law enforcement agencies. However, the court noted that its 
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observations were like those of Judge Hanson's: there were 
multiple transactions, the theft of a bundle of credit cards, the 
use of false driver's licenses, all part of carefully thought-out 
plan (R. 411). On these facts, plus the dearth of information 
about defendant's background in the presentence report and 
defendant's refusal to cooperate with law enforcement in 
explaining this and other crimes, the court felt justified in 
imposing consecutive indeterminate sentences of from one to 
fifteen years, to be served consecutively with the same term for 
a single count of the same offense imposed by Judge Hanson (R. 
414-15). 
Defendant originally appealed his sentences on the ground 
that the trial court had demanded his cooperation at sentencing 
by requesting he give information that would reveal additional 
criminal activities, in violation of his right to silence under 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, or risk harsher 
punishment (see Docketing Statement, p. 2, and Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Affirmance in Case No. 
930278-CA, pp. 1-2). On April 5, 1994, this Court dismissed 
defendant's appeal for failure to file a brief (R. 421). 
Six months later, on October 12, 1994, pursuant to rule 
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant filed a motion 
to correct sentence, in which he again claimed that the trial 
court had demanded his cooperation at sentencing*by requesting he 
give information that would reveal additional criminal 
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activities, in violation of his right to silence under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, or risk harsher punishment 
(R. 428-442). 
At the hearing on his motion defendant summarized the events 
of the three sentencing hearings (R. 460-465), emphasizing that 
at one point in the proceedings the trial court was no longer 
requesting that he supply background information for the 
presentence report, but rather information concerning the overall 
scheme without any protection in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights, all of which rendered the imposition of the harsher 
consecutive sentences illegal (R. 463-67). 
In rebuttal, the prosecution argued that the gravity of the 
circumstances of the offenses justified the imposition of the 
consecutive sentences: that because defendant had evidently been 
working with others whose identities remained undisclosed the 
consecutive sentences served the trial court's concern that 
defendant would return to criminal activity; that defendant had 
refused to provide any information that would relate to his 
rehabilitative needs or identify mitigating factors; that 
defendant had an obligation to disclose the facts of his 
offenses; and that conviction for the same offenses in Judge 
Hanson's court constituted a substantial criminal history 
meriting harsh punishment (R. 469-73). Particularly, the 
prosecution noted that defendant could have avoided any jeopardy 
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for federal prosecution, but that he refused to give any 
information at all (R. 474). 
In denying defendant's rule 22(e) motion, the court found 
that in spite of defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege, which he only asserted at the third sentencing hearing 
(R. 452), defendant had supplied no mitigating information 
regarding his participation in the offenses or any documentation 
necessary for a complete background check, and that AP&P had 
recommended consecutive terms (R. 479, 453; PSR#2, p.4) (Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
to Correct Sentence, hereinafter "Ruling," R. 451-55, attached as 
Addendum C). The court concluded that a defendant's refusal to 
cooperate could be considered as evidence of defendant's 
expectation to return to criminal activity; that although 
defendant had a right to assert his Fifth Amendment rights, that 
assertion did not give him the right to stand mute5 regarding 
non-inculpatory matters; and that the court did not have a basis 
to impose anything less than consecutive sentences when the only 
information before it was defendant's "highly culpable 
participation in a crime of substantial gravity" (R. 453). The 
court also concluded that since defendant had failed to prosecute 
his earlier appeal, he had waived all rights to any remedy that 
could have resulted from that appeal (R. 480-81; Ruling, R. 453). 
5
 The findings incorrectly use the word "moot" (R. 453). 
However, the trial court's intention, in view of defendant's 
refusal to speak to any investigator about any aspect of the 
case, is clear. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim 
because defendant abandoned an appeal by failing to file an 
appellant's brief on precisely the same issue raised in this 
appeal. Thereafter, this Court dismissed that earlier appeal, 
which, under the circumstances of this case, should act as a bar 
to the presentation of a subsequent appeal on the same issue. 
POINT II 
The Court should also refuse to consider defendant's claim 
because he failed to object to an independent ground supporting 
the trial court's ruling denying his motion to correct sentence, 
i.e., that defendant waived his rights to remedies sought upon 
his motion because he had failed to prosecute his earlier appeal. 
Moreover, defendant has not even challenged the substance of that 
ruling on appeal. Additionally, defendant has failed not only to 
cite to the relevant record in challenging the trial court's 
ruling, but has also failed to include the very ruling which he 
purports to challenge and which is purportedly the basis of the 
present appeal in his brief, either through record reference or 
attachment in an addendum, as required by rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. These procedural omissions suggest that 
defendant wishes this Court to overlook the ruling, which is the 
actual subject of his current appeal, because it is adverse to 
12 
him and explicitly notes his failure to pursue his earlier appeal 
as an independent ground for denying his motion. 
POINT III 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing 
defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment. The trial court 
pressed defendant to cooperate with law enforcement in disclosing 
the facts of the credit card fraud and other related crimes or 
risk being sentenced to consecutive sentences. The trial court 
was, however, very concerned that defendant persisted in refusing 
to disclose any information whatsoever to Adult Probation and 
Parole about his background or the facts of his participation a 
complex and sophisticated credit card fraud. As a result of 
defendant's refusal to provide any information, the court had 
absolutely no mititigating information on which to base a more 
lenient sentence or to consider defendant anything but a poor 
risk for rehabilitation. 
The trial court properly recognized that defendant was 
entitled to assert his privilege to remain silent, but that 
exercise of the privilege did not give defendant the right to 
refuse blanketly to answer non-inculpatory questions. Defendant 
never established that his fear of federal prosecution was 
sufficient to make lawful his refusal to anwer questions which 
had never actually been put to him, entirely apart from refusing 
any questions whatsoever. Further, it is disputed on the record 
whether defendant did not receive an authorization of immunity 
because of his general refusal to cooperate. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL AND DISMISS THE 
APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT ABANDONED HIS PRIOR 
APPEAL, WHICH RAISED THE SAME ISSUE ADDRESSED 
IN THIS APPEAL 
Defendant's second appeal challenged the imposition of 
consecutive sentences on the ground that the trial court had 
demanded his cooperation at sentencing by requesting he give 
information that would reveal additional criminal activities, in 
violation of his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution, or risk harsher punishment (see Docketing 
Statement, p. 2. and Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Affirmance in Case No. 930278-CA, pp. 1-2). Defendant 
raises exclusively and precisely the same issue in this appeal. 
This Court dismissed defendant's earlier appeal for failure to 
file an appellant's brief (R. 421). 
The general rule is that a prior dismissal of an appeal for 
want of prosecution acts as a bar to a subsequent appeal as to 
all questions that were presented on the earlier appeal. Bray v. 
Cox, 342 N.E.2d 575, 576-77 (N.Y. 1976) (per curiam); In re 
Crescenzi, 475 N.E.2d 453, 454 (N.Y. 1985); H & S Ltd. v. 
Andreola, 363 N.W.2d 592, 593-95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); First Am. 
Nat. Bank of Iuka v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So.2d 481, 493 (Miss. 
1978). 
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Because defendant abandoned and acquiesced in the dismissal 
of his earlier appeal, this Court should find that defendant is 
barred from raising the same issues in a successive appeal. Am. 
Housing Corp. v. Richardson, 18 Utah 2d 197, 198-99, 417 P.2d 
973, 974 (1966) (refusing to consider issues raised by 
intervenors in a appeal dismissed following stipulation on the 
issues by the principal parties, an appeal thus considered "dead" 
by the supreme court); cf. Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 616 
(Utah 1994) (refusing to consider in the defendant's appeal from 
a denial of a petition for post-conviction relief essentially the 
same claim that had earlier been made on direct appeal, i.e., 
alleged error not to hold bifurcated hearing). Because the issue 
defendant has raised in this appeal is barred, this Court should 
decline to consider the issue and dismiss the appeal. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL AND DISMISS THE 
APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEITHER OBJECTED TO 
ONE OF THE COURT'S REASONS FOR DENYING HIS 
MOTION, A CONCLUSION OF LAW WHICH CONSTITUTED 
AN INDEPENDENT, ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION, 
NOR DOES DEFENDANT CHALLENGE OR REFER TO THE 
ORDER DENYING HIS MOTION, WHICH IS 
PURPORTEDLY THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT'S APPEAL 
A. Failure to Object at Sentencing 
or Assign Error on Appeal 
"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection must be 
made in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Absent a timely 
objection, [an appellate court] will review an alleged error only 
if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes "plain 
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error." State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989) 
(citations omitted). 
The waiver rule applies in sentencing proceedings as well as 
at trial. See State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991) 
(refusing to consider the merits of the defendant's claims 
because the defendant "failed to make specific objections to any 
of these alleged defects at the sentencing hearing, as required 
by Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a), and therefore, he has waived his 
right to raise these issues at this time"). Moreover, an 
appellate court will not consider an issue for the first time on 
appeal when the defendant did not argue plain error. State v. 
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992) (refusing to 
consider an arguably meritorious claim where plain error was not 
argued on appeal); State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah 
App. 1994) (refusing to disturb the sentencing where defendant 
failed to object or argue plain error in a reply brief), cert. 
denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995).6 
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court addressed the 
merits of defendant's arguments (R. 478-80; Ruling, R. 451-53). 
However, as an independent ground for denying the motion, the 
trial court ruled that since defendant had failed to prosecute 
his earlier appeal, he had waived all rights to any remedy that 
6
 Generally, an argument made for the first time in a reply 
brief will not be considered by the reviewing court. State v. 
Harrv, 873 P.2d 1149, (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Brown, 
853 P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992)). This case is entirely unlike 
Peterson, where the defendant had at least addressed the 
substance of her claim in her opening brief, thereby giving the 
State an opportunity to respond. (See discussion below.) 
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could have resulted from that appeal (R. 480-81; Ruling, R. 453). 
Defendant did not challenge the trial court's independent reason 
at the sentencing (R. 481); nor does he assign error or even 
refer to it on appeal. Because defendant does not claim that the 
trial court erred in finding that he had waived his rights 
concerning his sentencing for failure to prosecute his appeal, 
that ruling, as an independent ground for denying defendant's 
motion, should remain undisturbed, and this Court should decline 
to address the merits of the defendant's claim in this appeal. 
B. Failure to Properly Brief Claim on Appeal 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of 
the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(7) A statement of the case. The 
statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review shall follow. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a 
statement that no addendum is necessary under 
this paragraph. . . . The addendum shall 
contain a copy of: 
(C) those parts of the record on 
appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as . . . . 
the . . . . findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, [or] the transcript of the court's 
oral decision . . . . 
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(e) References in briefs to the record. 
References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record . . . . 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (emphasis added). 
In State v. Price, the defendant failed to correlate the 
issues with the substance of the brief, omitted references to the 
course of proceedings and disposition of the trial court, and 
failed to cite to the record with respect to relevant facts or 
provide any meaningful factual or legal analysis. State v. 
Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248-250 (Utah App. 1992). This Court noted 
these shortcomings under rule 24, and, accordingly, refused to 
address the merits of defendant's claim on appeal. Id. at 24 9-
50. 
This appeal is purportedly an attack on the trial court's 
denial of defendant's rule 22(e) motion. Appellant's Br. at 1. 
Defendant's brief, however, entirely fails to identify the ruling 
from which the appeal is taken, referencing instead the 
sentencing from which he took an earlier appeal which was 
subsequently dismissed. All page references in defendant's brief 
are to the original sentencing instead of to either the hearing 
or written ruling putatively challenged in this appeal. As a 
result, not only is there no challenge to an independent basis 
for the court's denial of the motion (discussed above), there is 
not even an effective challenge to the trial court's rule 22(e) 
ruling in this case. 
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In failing to make the obvious and necessary references to 
the only ruling which from which defendant appeals, defendant has 
not made an ingenuous mistake, but rather deliberately attempted 
to make an end-run around this Court's dismissal of defendant's 
earlier appeal and the jurisdictional rules. 
It is apparent that following the dismissal of the earlier 
appeal, the filing of another notice of appeal six months later 
from the same trial court ruling would be untimely under rule 
4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.7 Only by the expedient 
of claiming an illegal sentence under rule 22 (e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, has defendant been able to resurrect a 
challenge to his sentence. However, defendant's appeal on the 
precise issue of the legality of his sentence has already been 
dismissed by this Court for failure to file a brief. Moreover, 
as the discussion above illustrates, this appeal is, by all its 
record references and discussion, really just another attempt to 
7
 Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as 
a matter of right from the trial court to the 
appellate court, the notice of appeal 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from, 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a). In Johnson, the defendant also failed to 
timely file a notice of appeal. The 30-day period for filing a 
notice of appeal in a criminal case is jurisdictional and cannot 
be enlarged by an appellate court. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 
36, 37 (Utah 1981). Therefore, "[o]ut-of-time appeals must be 
dismissed." Id. 
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appeal the original sentencing order, rather than to genuinely 
appeal from the trial court's ruling denying defendant's rule 
22(e) motion to correct an illegal sentence. If this Court were 
to allow a defendant to perennially attack his sentence under 
rule 22(e) where the basis of the challenge had already been the 
subject of a dismissed appeal, there would be no end to the 
possible number of appeals a defendant could legitimately file. 
Therefore, on the facts of this case, it would be improper 
to consider the merits of defendant's challenge, and this appeal 
should be dismissed.8 While the State feels confident that, 
based on the foregoing argument, this Court should not consider 
the merits of defendant's argument, the State has, nonetheless, 
addressed defendant's claim. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SENTENCED DEPENDANT 
TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT 
A. Introduction and Standard of Review 
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the 
trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all 
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds 
8
 Defendant's proper recourse lies not in pursuing this 
appeal, but in post-conviction proceedings under rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, wherein he may allege the 
ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to prosecute the prior 
appeal (Case No. 930278-CA), wherein the issue in this appeal was 
first presented and abandoned. See Bundv v. Deland, 763 P.2d 
803, 805 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that " [i] f counsel's 
deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to deprive plaintiff of 
the effective assistance of counsel, they constitute a violation 
of due process that is clearly reviewable by habeas corpus 
review"). It would appear that the present appeal is an effort 
to avoid just such an undertaking. 
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legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 457 
(Utah App. 1993). "[B]efore the reviewing court may overturn the 
sentence given by the trial court[,] 'it must be clear that the 
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1978) (emphasis in original). ,f/[T]he exercise of 
discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find 
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887). 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
in sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences because he 
refused, to cooperate with law enforcement in providing 
information about the offenses, which, without immunity, 
allegedly would have compelled him to unlawfully waive his right 
to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution.9 Appellant's Br. at 9-10. The claim, however, 
9
 Defendant's claim under article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution does not warrant special attention. Defendant 
relies only on cases applying the Fifth Amendment and does not 
suggest that any different analysis should be applied under the 
Utah Constitution. Therefore, the Court need consider the merits 
of defendant's claim under the federal constitution only. State 
v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.2 (Utah App.) ("Defendant has 
failed to provide a separate analysis under the Utah 
Constitution. We therefore consider his right to counsel claim 
under the United States Constitution only," citing State v. 
Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), cert, denied. 
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fails to take into account that by refusing to provide any 
information whatsoever about himself or the serious, multiple 
offenses of which he was convicted, the trial court had no other 
reasonable recourse under the sentencing statute but to sentence 
defendant consecutively. Additionally, under the circumstances 
of this case, defendant failed to satisfy his burden to show that 
(1) he had a genuine apprehension of additional prosecution for 
federal offenses if he cooperated with law enforcement and (2) 
that he could not have provided some useful information to law 
enforcement or AP&P that would have provided a basis for 
mitigating his sentence without compelling him to waive his Fifth 
Amendment rights, all of which remained concerns of the trial 
court notwithstanding its request for his cooperation. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Considered 
Defendant's Uncooperativeness with Law 
Enforcement and Defendant's Rehabilitative 
Needs, Notwithstanding the Assertion of 
Fifth Amendment Rights 
1. The Law 
The statute governing the imposition of consecutive or 
concurrent sentences provides: "A court shall consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (1995). 
504 U.S. 911, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992)), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 
1990)). 
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In imposing a sentence that appropriately recognizes a 
defendant's rehabilitative needs, the trial court necessarily 
considers the degree to which a defendant is willing to cooperate 
with law enforcement by disclosing his knowledge of crime: 
This deeply rooted social obligation is 
not diminished when the witness to crime is 
involved in illicit activity himself. Unless 
his silence is protected by the privilege 
against self-incrimination . . . the criminal 
defendant no less than the ordinary citizen 
is obliged to assist the authorities. The 
petitioner, for example, was asked to expose 
the purveyors of heroin in his own community 
in exchange for a favorable disposition of 
his case. By declining to cooperate, 
petitioner rejected an "obligatio[n] of 
community life" that should be recognized 
before rehabilitation can begin. . . . 
Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate 
protected his former partners in crime, 
thereby preserving his ability to resume 
criminal activities upon release. Few facts 
available to a sentencing judge are more 
relevant to lf,the likelihood that [a 
defendant] will transgress no more, the hope 
that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts 
to assist with a lawful future career, [and] 
the degree to which he does or not deem 
himself at war with his society.'" 
Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558, 100 S. Ct. 1358, 
1363 (1980) (citations omitted). See State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 
at 1120-22 (sentence of middle severity properly imposed for lack 
of cooperation where defendant denied his acts before trial and 
actually asserted that minor child had initiated sexual contact); 
United States v. Malekzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(applying Roberts, most severe sentence properly imposed for 
failure to cooperate, notwithstanding a claim of penalization for 
exercise of right to remain silent), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1029 
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(1989); United States v. Bradford, 645 F.2d 115, 117 (2nd Cir. 
1981) (same). 
The key question is whether, under the facts of the given 
case, the court imposed the more severe sentences because the 
defendant refused to cooperate with law enforcement after 
properly exercising his Fifth Amendment right, or because the 
court was genuinely concerned with the defendant's rehabilitative 
needs. 
2. In Sentencing Defendant, the Trial 
Court was Reasonably Concerned with 
Defendant's Refusal to Cooperate bv 
Providing Any Useful Information 
In United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), 
cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979), a pre-Roberts case, the 
district court imposed the maximum sentences on a defendant who 
refused to recant his claim of innocence and to cooperate for 
fear of losing his right of appeal through waiver of his right to 
silence. Id. at 1137-38. In considering the appropriate 
sentence, the district court noted that it had considered the 
presentence report, that defendant was "simply the tip of the 
iceberg", that "the defendant has consistently declined to co-
operate in any way with the prosecuting and investigating 
officials in their efforts to bring into Court all of those who 
are involved in this very substantial operation," and that it was 
aware that the defendant was in no way obligated to incriminate 
himself. Id. at 1137-38 n. 18. The Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, recognizing the distinction between punishing a 
defendant for maintaining his innocence and considering a 
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defendant's failure to recant when evaluating his prospects for 
rehabilitation, found the district court's focus to have been on 
the latter and held the imposition of the greater sentence 
proper. Id. at 1138-39. 
The State does not dispute that if a trial court sentenced a 
defendant to a harsher sentence only on account of his 
legitimately asserting his Fifth Amendment right, the sentence 
would be unlawful. United States v. Safirstein, 827 F.2d 1389, 
1388-39 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Roberts, 445 U.S. at 559-
60, 100 S. Ct. at 1363-64, wherein the defendant did not 
intelligibly assert his right to silence at sentencing). 
However, this is not the case here. Instead, while the trial 
court informed defendant that if he cooperated with the 
prosecutor's investigator by disclosing information about the 
offenses for which defendant was convicted, as well as other 
crimes suggested by the evidence, that it would be inclined to 
impose concurrent rather than consecutive terms of imprisonment 
(R. 397-402), it was largely concerned with defendant's failure 
to make any disclosure about himself at all that would have aided 
it in assessing a proper sentence under the sentencing statute, a 
concern which it expressed at every sentencing hearing (Hearing 
of 1/4/93, R. 383-83, 385, 88-89, 391-93/ Hearing of 2/22/93,- R. 
398; Hearing of 3/22/93, R. 402, 414), 
The trial court recognized that defendant's disinclination 
to cooperate with law enforcement represented an attitude problem 
for which more severe sentencing was appropriate (R. 398). It 
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further recognized that without supplying the most minimal 
information to AP&P, both in the instant case and in that tried 
before Judge Hanson, the court had little guidance (R. 385), and 
that defendant had failed to make open and adequate disclosure 
which would have indicated something of defendant's honesty (R. 
390) .10 The court informed defendant that he had nothing to 
lose by at least giving AP&P the names of his relatives, who, 
even if they did not want to become involved, could speak to his 
good character (R. 392), but defendant did not make even this 
modest concession. 
Most importantly, even after pressing defendant for his 
cooperation in disclosing the particulars of this and other 
10
 Both presentence reports reflect defendant's total 
failure to supply AP&P with any information about himself or the 
crimes he was convicted of. In the case tried before Judge 
Hanson: defendant declined to provide AP&P with a statement 
about the offense (PSR#1, p. 3, par. B); the prosecution did not 
have sufficient information to verify information defendant gave 
about his name and date of birth (PSR#1, p. 4, par. I); defendant 
could not provide the AP&P investigator information about 
educational institutions which he had attended, nor the accurate 
locations of his mother and cousins from whom he purportedly 
received some support, and defendant would not disclose any 
information about a Mr. Paul Smith, who allegedly supplied the 
money to retain counsel in this case (PSR#1, p. 5, par. C); 
collateral contacts could provide no information about defendant 
(PSR#1, p. 7); and, defendant was evasive in giving information 
about collateral contacts, the Secret Service had been contacted 
and were unable to very defendant's birth in the Virgin Islands 
or any other information and that defendant had refused to 
provide any information that would assist in verifying his place 
of birth (PSR#1, p. 8). 
The brief presentence report in this case, also shows that 
defendant was "very evasive" in disclosing the names of family 
members or associates, allegedly because they would be harassed 
by agents of the criminal justice system (PSR#2, p. 3). Indeed, 
at the third sentencing hearing, defense counsel acknowledged 
that defendant had been uncooperative (R. 407). 
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similar offenses, the trial court, at the third sentencing 
hearing, continued to express its concern that defendant had been 
convicted of multiple offenses involving a complex crime about 
which defendant refused to cooperate in explaining and that the 
presentence report disclosed little background information, 
leaving the court without information about possible other 
criminal behavior (Hearing of 3/22/93, R. 414). In denying 
defendant's motion, the court again noted that the presentence 
report gave little useful familial history which precluded AP&P 
from making collateral contacts that would result in useful 
information (R. 479). The court also noted that it had 
recognized defendant's right to exercise his Fifth Amendment 
privilege (R. 480). 
The court's written ruling reflected these perceptions: 
Only at the third sentencing hearing had defendant invoked his 
Fifth Amendment privilege out of fear of federal prosecution; the 
court had assured defendant that he could assert his right to 
remain silent, but that defendant had been involved in a highly 
sophisticated criminal enterprise, "and that because no 
information had been presented to the Court to mitigate against 
the known gravity of the crime, the equities weighed in favor of 
the imposition of a lengthy prison sentence" (Ruling, par. 3, R. 
452). [Emphasis added.] The court further noted that " [a]t no 
time has the defendant come forward with documentation indicating 
his name, date of birth or other information necessary to conduct 
the thorough background investigation and criminal history check 
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routinely relied upon by the Court in determining sentence" 
(Ruling, par. 4, R. 452-53). 
In concluding, the trial court stated: 
1. A sentencing court may appropriately 
consider a defendant's refusal to cooperate 
with law enforcement investigation of 
criminal activities known to the defendant as 
evidence of his expectation to return to 
criminal activities, thus warranting a 
lengthier sentence, unless the defendant 
righteously asserts a constitutional right; a 
defendant's right guaranteed by the 5th 
Amendment protects the defendant from being 
compelled to give testimony against himself, 
but does not provide him a blanket privilege 
to stand moot fsicl regarding non-inculpatory 
matters and demand that the sentencing court 
assume his good character. 
2. A sentencing court must weigh the gravity 
of the crime against the defendant's 
background, history and rehabilitative needs 
toward determining whether to impose 
consecutive or concurrent sentences; when the 
only information available to a sentencing 
court demonstrates the defendant's highly 
culpable participation in a crime of 
substantial gravity, it is not inappropriate 
to impose consecutive sentences. [Emphasis 
added.] 
(Ruling, R. 453). 
This record shows that the trial court properly applied 
section 76-3-401 and the policy requiring culpable defendants to 
cooperate with law enforcement, and that its actions in 
sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences, a decision 
recommended by the AP&P investigator (PSR#2, p. 4), were not so 
inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion, 
notwithstanding defendant's assertion of Fifth Amendment rights. 
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C. Defendant Failed to Properly Assert 
His Fifth Amendment Rights 
The trial court correctly observed that defendant's 
assertion of his constitutional right to remain silent did not 
provide him with a blanket privilege to remain mute as to non-
inculpatory matters (R. 453). First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Utah 1984) ("[The privilege 
against self-incrimination] may not generally be asserted as a 
blanket response to all discovery."); Matter of Criminal 
Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct. No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 646-47 (Utah 
1988) (in a grand jury proceeding the privilege extends only to 
specific incriminating questions); State v. White, 671 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1983) (the Fifth Amendment privilege comes into play 
only with respect to specific questions and cannot be claimed in 
advance of the questions being asked). 
If a grand jury witness invokes the Fifth Amendment, then 
the grand jury can seek a judicial determination as to the bona 
fides of the witness's Fifth Amendment claim, "in which case the 
witness must satisfy the court that the claim of privilege is not 
a subterfuge." United States v. Manduiano, 425 U.S. 564, 575, 96 
S. Ct. 1768, 1776 (1976). The burden is on the defendant to show 
that his fear of incrimination is genuine. Bradford. 645 F.2d at 
118. If the assertion of the privilege is found reasonable, then 
the prosecution must consider an offer of immunity if the 
witness's testimony is to be compelled. Manduiano, 425 U.S. at 
575, 96 S. Ct. at 1776 ("Immunity displaces the danger.") 
(citations omitted). 
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In this case defendant never gave law enforcement the 
opportunity to ask him any questions to which he might have 
invoked his privilege to remain silent, if appropriate. At the 
beginning of both the second and third sentencing hearings, 
continued for the very purpose of providing defendant the 
opportunity to disclose information to law enforcement, defendant 
acknowledged that he had not contacted AP&P (R. 394-95; R. 402-
03). Moreover, defendant only mentioned at the third sentencing 
hearing that his concern about imminent federal prosecution for 
similar offenses compelled him to assert his privilege (Hearing 
of 3/22/93, R. 405-06; hearing on motion, R. 476-77). However, 
defendant never offered any proof that his concerns were 
reasonably founded, and the trial court never made a finding to 
that effect. See United States v. Araomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1356 
(11th Cir. 1991) (remanding back to the district court to 
determine the existence of the Fifth Amendment privilege where 
the defendant had asserted a blanket claim). Moreover, at the 
hearing on his motion, the prosecutor argued that defendant could 
have provided the trial court with much information while still 
avoiding any jeopardy posed by possible federal prosecution (R. 
474), an argument defendant never rebutted. In fact, defendant 
never established that he actually was being investigated by 
federal authorities. 
Finally, defendant's claim that he could not cooperate where 
no immunity was offered is uncertain. Defendant'only first 
asserted that he had not been offered immunity at the hearing on 
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his rule 22(e) motion (R. 464-65), although the trial court noted 
at the third sentencing hearing that it would not expect 
defendant to incriminate himself by cooperating with law 
enforcement without an authorization of immunity (R. 410-11). 
However, at the hearing on the motion defendant did not rebut the 
prosecution's claim that "defendant showed no interest in 
cooperating even with a grant of immunity" (Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence, R. 447). 
In any event, the Salt Lake County Prosecutor's Office was hardly 
in a position to offer defendant immunity for federal 
prosecution, and there is no evidence that defendant took any 
steps to properly obtain an offer of immunity. 
It is defendant's total failure to disclose any information 
about himself and the circumstances of the offenses, coupled with 
defendant's belated assertion of his privilege to remain silent 
and the reasonable disposition of the trial court, that 
dramatically distinguishes Safirstein, the case which defendant 
primarily relies on, from this case. 
In Safirstein, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the imposition of consecutive, maximum sentences for the 
defendant's refusal to disclose the details of the offense "where 
it was evident from outset that Safirstein sought, by his 
refusal, to assert his privilege. In such circumstances, the 
refusal to cooperate does not necessarily reflect adversely upon 
a defendant's prospect's for rehabilitation." Safirstein, 827 
F.2d at 1389. 
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In this case defendant did not assert the Fifth Amendment 
until the third sentencing hearing, the tardiness of which the 
trial court obviously took, in part, to be an ad hoc rationale 
for defendant's on-going refusal to cooperate (see Ruling, par. 2 
& 3, R. 452). Also, the court in Safirstein, had the benefit of 
a presentence report which, at the very least, disclosed the 
defendant's educational, familial and professional history. 
Safirstein, 827 F.2d at 1387. In this case defendant refused at 
every juncture to provide the trial court with any information. 
The trial courts' radically different attitudes to the 
respective defendants in Safirstein and in this case are also 
important distinguishing factors. In Safirstein, the defendant 
was convicted of wilfully making a false statement and willful 
failure to report the attempted transportation of more than 
$10,000 in monetary instruments outside the United States. 
Safirstein, 827 F.2d at 1382-83. In holding that the district 
court had abused its discretion in imposing the sentences, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that not only had the 
district court sentenced defendant more harshly for failing to 
cooperate with law enforcement, but that it also had relied on 
unreasonable inferences about the defendant's complicity in an 
international drug trafficking, for which there was not a 
scintilla of evidence, and had dramatically departed from the 
presentence report's recommendations. It is impossible to escape 
the conclusion that the court of appeals was judiciously 
describing a vindictive and unreasonable sentencing procedure. 
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The attitude of the trial court in this case was altogether 
different. The record shows that the trial court acted 
judiciously throughout the proceedings, making only a reasonable 
demand upon defendant that he supply the trial court with some 
information that would assist it in sentencing him. Defendant, 
on the other hand, suggested at several points in the sentencing 
proceedings that the trial court had been improperly influenced 
by racially motivated suggestions from local newspapers that 
defendant belonged to a shadowy organization known as the 
"Nigerian Mafia" (R. 375-76, 407-08). However, the trial court 
noted that it was defendant who had injected the "Nigerian Mafia" 
into the proceedings (R. 411), and that the court had never 
considered the matter in sentencing (R. 386-87, 411) . In sum, 
the court fairly considered defendant's total failure to supply 
any information, including personal background or that which 
might have been useful to AP&P and law enforcement in elucidating 
this and other offenses, as evidence of his poor prospects for 
rehabilitation, and sentenced defendant accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that the trial court's rule 22(e) ruling and defendant's 
sentences be affirmed. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
Both issues presented in this case, i.e., the circumvention 
of appellate rules governing timely filed appeals and the 
propriety of imposing consecutive sentences when defendant has 
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totally failed to supply information, notwithstanding defendant's 
claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment, warrant oral 
argument and a written published opinion to further develop Utah 
law in these areas. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of September, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
/KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Robert L. Booker, Booker and Associates, attorneys for appellant, 
Associated Plaza, Suite 550, 349 South Second East, Salt Lake 
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City, Utah 84111, this J_ day of September, 1995. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-5678 
IN THE UTAQ COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
LOUIS M. CLARK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Case No. 930278-CA 
1 (Priority No. 2) 
The appellant, by his attorney, files the following 
docketing statement pursuant to Rule 9, U.R.A.P. 
DATE OF JUDGMENT 
The judgment sought to be reviewed was entered on March 
23, 1993. 
NOTICE OF"APPEAL 
The notice of appeal was filed on or about April 22, 
1993. 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHQRITJC 
Jurisdiction^* vestfd^n this court by Rule 3, U.R.A.P.; 
Rule 26, V.ft.Cr.P ?7; ffg£j&^^ as 
amended). 
«» \vi^^SBSSflS^^SS^siis^SS^fo counts 
of False mkinqim^W^mmm^^W^^^^^r^^^t^n JCaid & 
violation *j*e&Bmgm!BBBmm 
<5» 
tr 
2 
STATEHEFT Qf FACT? 
The -appellant was convicted after a "jury trial on 
November 17 and 13/ 1992. Additional facts are not presently known 
to his counsel who was not his counsel during trial. Such facts 
will be disclosed by the transcript. At sentencinq the lower court 
advised the defendant +hat if he made a statement to law 
enforcement officials about all of his alleged criminal activities, 
the Court might be favorably inclined to - enter concurrent 
sentences. The defendant declined to make such a statement. - The 
Court sentenced him to consecutive sentences. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. whether the lower court erred or abused its 
discretion in sentencing the defendant to consecutive sentences. 
2. Such other issues as may appear from the transcript 
of the trial. 
PPTEFMIPATIVE MJTPO*mE$ 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah. 
Fifth ^ ^^^o^^i^^^^^^B^^^^^l^^nltBd States 
Constitution. 
Utah Code -Ann1; fS76V3-*0~l..:; 
ttTOIPP CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Docketing Statement was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, on the 1^ day of July, 1993 • 
ADDENDUM B 
EDWARD K. BRASS (#432) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 6th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-5678 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LOUIS M. CLARK, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
: TO SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 930278-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Defendant, by and through his attorney, Edward K. Brass, 
hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Affirmance. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After a two day jury trial, held on November 17 and 18, 
1992, the appellant was convicted on two counts of Falsely 
Making, Coding or signing a Financial Transaction Card in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-506.1 (1990). 
1. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court advised 
appellant that if he made a statement to law enforcement 
officials about all of his alleged criminal activities, the court 
might be favorably inclined to enter concurrent rather than 
consecutive sentences. 
2. When the appellant declined to make such a statement, 
the court sentenced him to consecutive sentences. 
3, Present counsel did not represent appellant at trial, 
therefore, the facts of as disclosed at trial are presently 
unknown to him, 
4. Present counsel is unable to adequately identify 
additional issues which are appropriately included in this appeal 
until he has the opportunity to review the trial transcripts. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellee's Memorandum in Support of Summary Affirmance, 
alleges appellant's docketing statement fails to provide detail 
as to the basis for this claim of error and that the issue 
appellant identified fails to present a substantial issue for 
review. However, appellants docketing statement complies with 
Rule 10 U.R.A.P.(c)(5) which says a docketing statement is to 
clearly express the terms and circumstances of the case without 
unnecessary detail.1 The docketing statement in its entirety 
asks: Whether it is abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
condition defendant's sentence on a waiver of his constitutional 
«i 
right to "noi be compelled to give evidence against himself" 
•i 
under Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah and the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States' Constitution. 
Although the court is charged by statute to -consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
1
 U.R.A.P* Rule 10 (c)(5) states in pertinent part: "The 
issues presented by the appeal, [should be] expressed in the 
terms and circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary 
detail." 
2 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant," Utah Code 
Ann- Section 76-3-401(2)(1990), this statute does not direct the 
court to threaten the defendant with a harsher sentence if he 
invokes his right to remain silent rather than provide 
information to the court. 
Whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion when 
it gave the defendant an ultimatum to provide information or risk 
a harsher sentence clearly presents a substantial issue for 
review. 
With regard to potential issues that may appear upon 
present counsel's review of the trial transcript, although 
appellee addresses this issue in a footnote, the fact is, without 
the opportunity to review the trial transcripts present counsel 
cannot adequately brief issues that may be appropriate for 
appeal. Present counsel did not represent appellant at trial, 
therefore, the facts as disclosed at trial are presently unknown 
to him and there may very well be additional issues that should 
be included in this appeal. Indeed, the defendant and other 
observers ha^e alluded to the possibility of other such issues. 
However, present counsel believes that to assert such issues in a 
docketing statement without support from a written record would 
be tantamount to bad faith. For example, the defendant and 
others have alleged he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. His claim is supported to some extent by former 
counsel's filing of a notice of appeal in this action months 
before he defendant was sentenced. In fact, he then took no 
3 
other action to pursue the improperly filed appeal and this Court 
dismissed it, all still before the lower court proceeding had 
concluded. However, present counsel is reluctant to make such a 
damaging allegation without support from a written record. 
Rule 10(f) U.R.A.P allows the court to defer its ruling as 
to any issue raised by a motion for summary disposition, until 
plenary presentation and consideration of the case. Because, 
present counsel was not trial counsel and it is probable that 
issues will present themselves upon review of the trial 
transcript it is appropriate for the court to defer any 
unfavorable ruling it may entertain until counsel has the 
opportunity to adequately brief all issues that may present 
themselves in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
For each or any of the foregoing reasons, the appellee's 
motion for summary affirmance should be denied or in the 
alternative deferred. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this / 7 day of August, 1M3. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
BARBARA J. BYRNE, Bar No. 3920 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. 
LOUIS M. CLARK, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING 
> DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
| CORRECT SENTENCE 
i Case No. 921901498 
I Hon. KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Defendant's Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence having come before this Court for 
hearing in the above entitled matter on November 7,1994, and the Court having fully considered 
the pleadings and other documents filed in this case, having considered the arguments of counsel, 
having presided over the trial and otherwise being fully advised in the matter before it, this Court 
now enters its FINDINGS of FACT, CONCLUSIONS of LAW and ORDER: 
FILED DISTRICT C0UHT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 6 1994 
Deputy Clerk 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 22,1993, the defendant, Louis M. Clark, was sentenced to consecutive 
terms of 1-15 years at the Utah State Prison based on his convictions by jury of two counts of 
Falsely Signing a Financial Transaction Card Receipt, each a Second Degree Felony. 
2. On January 4 and February 22,1993, sentencing hearings were continued in order to 
allow the defendant an opportunity to provide the State and the Court information needed to aid 
in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed; through representations by counsel at each 
of these hearings the defendant expressed a willingness to provide additional information if 
allowed the opportunity; the defendant did not express any intention to exercise his right to 
remain silent. 
3. At the March 22 hearing, for the first time, the defendant expressed through counsel 
his interest in asserting a 5th Amendment privilege toward refusing to provide information that 
may have exposed him to jeopardy of prosecution by the federal government for conduct related 
to the crimes for which he had been convicted in Utah, and the defendant argued that earlier 
directions that he should cooperate with law enforcement placed him in an unfair predicament. 
The Court responded by reassuring the defendant that he did have the right to remain silent, but 
apprised the defendant that the information available to the Court indicated his highly culpable 
participation in a sophisticated criminal enterprise-involving credit cards stolen in Texas and 
forged identification from Virginia used at banks in Utah, and that because no information had 
been presented to the Court to mitigate against the known gravity of the crime, the equities 
weighed in favor of the imposition of a lengthy prison sentence. 
4. At no time has the defendant come forward with documentation indicating his name, 
date of birth, place of birth or other information necessary to conduct the thorough background 
00452 
Findings, Conclusions and Order 
State v. Clark 
Page 3 
investigation and criminal history check routinely relied upon by the Court in determining 
sentence. 
5. The recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole and the State of Utah was that the 
defendant be committed to consecutive terms of incarceration at the Utah State Prison. 
6. Although a notice of appeal was filed on behalf of the defendant, no direct appeal on 
the merits of the defendant's convictions was prosecuted. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A sentencing court may appropriately consider a defendant's refusal to cooperate with 
law enforcement investigation of criminal activities known to the defendant as evidence of his 
expectation to return to criminal activities, thus warranting a lengthier sentence, unless the 
defendant righteously asserts a constitute. ~al right; a defendant's right guaranteed by the 5th 
Amendment protects the defendant from being compelled to give testimony against himself, but 
does not provide him a blanket privilege to stand moot regarding non-inculpatory matters and 
demand that the sentencing court assume his good character. 
2. A sentencing court must weigh the gravity of the crime against the defendant's 
background, history and rehabilitative needs toward determining whether to impose consecutive 
or concurrent sentences; when the only information available to a sentencing court demonstrates 
the defendant's highly culpable participation in a crime of substantial gravity, it is not 
inappropriate to impose consecutive sentences. 
3. A defendant who fails to timely prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction waives 
all claim to any remedy that may have been granted by appeal. 
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ORDER 
Having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW, THEREFORE, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant's Motion to Correct an 
Illegal Sentence is DENIED. 
Dated the jL_ day ofNeiSicr7l994 
Judge, Third District Court 
Approved as to form: 
ROBERT L. BOOKER 
Counsel for defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Robert L. Booker, Attorney for Defendant, by 
mailing a copy to 349 South Second East, Suite 550, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this HjrDsv of 
November, 1994. 
toffk &*tm> fy*, Pec tityti'l ^ c 
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